

AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL NGOs IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

BILL MORTON

1. INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of the provision of aid through civil society organizations (CSOs) needs to take into account the particular case of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).¹ They are a powerful force in the delivery of aid, and important actors within the international development architecture. They are now providing more aid to developing countries than ever before, and the budgets of particularly large INGOs have surpassed those of some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donor countries.² Eight INGOs (World Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International, Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE International, CARITAS International and ActionAid International) had combined revenue of more than US\$11.7 billion in 2011, up 40 percent since 2005. INGOs represent a major presence in many developing countries, receive substantial sums from donors to carry out humanitarian assistance and development work, and are an increasingly influential actor in policy processes and in the global governance of aid.



2. NATURE OF INGOs

2.1 WHAT DISTINGUISHES INGOs FROM NATIONAL CSOs IN BOTH DONOR COUNTRIES AND HOST COUNTRIES?

INGOs in donor countries are different from other national CSOs in donor and recipient countries in several respects, including in terms of their global operations, their size, scale, geographic reach, access to funds, budgets, and roles in development.

Membership of global consortia: A key factor that distinguishes INGOS from national CSOs in donor countries is that they have global operations. INGOs usually have multiple autonomous national offices based in many OECD and some middle-income developing countries, but they also operate together as members of global consortia, confederations or affiliations that undertake development programmes through their own regional and national offices in a large number of developing countries. Thus Oxfam Canada, for instance, is an autonomous organization with its own governance structure but is a member of the Oxfam International confederation that has 16 other member organizations. CARE USA is a member of CARE International, a confederation of 14 member organizations.

Global reach: INGOs have extensive global programmatic reach as a result of their membership of global confederations. While individual national INGO affiliates may only directly manage or operate programmes in a relatively small number of countries, they can participate across the whole range of the confederation's programme countries (by providing financial resources or advice). For instance, Save the

Children works in 120 countries globally,³ World Vision International in 98 countries,⁴ and Oxfam International in more than 90 countries.⁵ The global reach of INGOs often exceeds that of many individual OECD official donor bilateral geographic programmes.

Size and scope: INGOs are generally much larger than other national CSOs in donor countries, in terms of budgets, number of staff, and operations. For instance, in Australia, two of the main INGOs (Oxfam Australia and World Vision Australia) have over 200 members of staff based in Australia, whereas nearly all other national CSOs have under 50, and usually much fewer. INGOs also typically have much larger budgets than national CSOs: in 2011 World Vision Australia's revenue was US\$345 million,⁶ and Oxfam Australia's was US\$76.5 million, compared to most national CSOs that had revenue below US\$10 million, and many of them below US\$1 million.

The much larger budgets that INGOs command is the result of a range of factors, including increased capacity for fundraising from the public, governments and other institutions, greater legitimacy and influence with government and other donors, and greater capacity to use funds at economies of scale. These factors also mean that large INGOs are more likely to gain core or framework funding agreements from donor governments, and in larger amounts. National-level INGOs are also able to tap into the global financial and staff resources of their confederations (discussed more in Section 3).

Organizational capacity: INGOs' larger budgets and staff contingents allow for dedicated staff across a full range of operations and programming, meaning that INGOs generally have both broader and deeper capacity than national CSOs. INGOs typically have

staff (often in dedicated teams) undertaking roles in organizational management, development programme implementation and management, humanitarian assistance, fundraising, communications and media, human resource management, finance and accounting, and policy and campaigning. Individual INGO national affiliates can also draw on the staff resources and expertise of their confederation members. In comparison, staff of national CSOs are often responsible for several roles in the organization, or make strategic decisions on where to concentrate staff resources (for instance, on how much staff time to dedicate to managing existing development programmes versus developing new programmes).

Many INGOs now also have dedicated staff working on monitoring, evaluation and learning. This allows INGOs to assess the results and impact of their work, to implement quality assurance and improvement measures, demonstrate accountability to partners, recipients and the public, and to report efficiently to donors on how funds have been used and on the overall impact of funded programmes. This type of work is specialized, resource-intensive and time-consuming, and many smaller national CSOs have limited capacity to undertake it, concentrating most of their efforts in reporting to official donors and their fundraising publics.

Range of partnerships: While most national CSOs in donor countries adopt a partnership approach to development programming, INGOs often work across a broader range of partnerships, and have the advantage that they can bring to these partnerships greater financial and other resources (in particular, expertise and knowledge). Like national CSOs, INGOs typically work in partnership with developing-country CSOs. However, their partnerships in both donor and

developing countries increasingly also extend to other institutions and the private sector. They are increasingly collaborating with academic and research centres, as well as the private sector, in the design and delivery of programmes, and drawing on additional resources from their consortium members when they do so. In some cases INGOs will also partner or collaborate with other INGOs, but are less likely to do so with national donor-country CSOs.

Legitimacy and influence: INGOs' size and scale, global reach, large staff contingents, range of programmes and partnerships and ability to demonstrate results afford them a level of professionalism, credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of donors and the public. As a result, INGOs have a comparatively higher profile than national CSOs, both with the public and with government and other donors. Although governments require INGOs to meet stringent eligibility and accountability requirements, they generally regard the largest INGOs as established development actors that have proven track records and, therefore, as trustworthy channels for the delivery of aid. In comparison, while seen as legitimate, national CSOs sometimes have a more difficult time demonstrating their eligibility for funding, because they do not have comparable levels of programme scale, staff capacity and resources. Greater visibility and reputation also allow INGOs to maintain their advantageous positions: they are better placed and can draw on greater resources to continue to demonstrate their legitimacy and to undertake continued fundraising.

These factors also mean that INGOs can have greater standing and 'voice' with decision makers, funding agencies and within policy processes. INGOs are, therefore, generally in a position to more strongly influence both the domestic and international

development policy agendas than national individual CSOs — making them “among the most powerful members of civil society” (although the latter can be effective working in coalition, often with INGOs).⁷ INGOs are usually better resourced to participate in global coalitions and campaigns, and can take a more active and influential role in them.

2.2 WHAT ARE THE ROLES OF INGOs IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?

INGO mission and mandate: INGOs have varied roles in development cooperation, and have varied approaches based on different models of development practice. However, there are strong similarities in the objectives they aim to achieve, and in their overall mandates. Key objectives for INGOs typically include the reduction of poverty and inequality, the realization of rights, the promotion of gender equality and social justice, protection of the environment and strengthening of civil society and democratic governance. For example, three of the largest INGOs have primary objectives based on poverty reduction:

- CARE International “shares a common vision to fight against worldwide poverty and to protect and enhance human dignity.”⁸
- Oxfam International is a “global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty.”⁹
- World Vision is “dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice.”¹⁰

INGO target groups and sectors: INGOs work with a wide range of target groups and sectors to achieve their

development objectives. While some have a special focus, many work in similar areas. Save The Children and Plan International, as their names suggest, have a specific focus on children and undertake programmes in health, nutrition, education, protection and child rights.¹¹ ActionAid works on food rights, women's rights, democratic governance, education, climate change and HIV/AIDS.¹² Many INGOs, such as World Vision International or Oxfam International, are involved in humanitarian assistance as well as long-term development programmes. One of the world's largest INGOs, Médecins sans Frontières works only on humanitarian assistance, delivering emergency aid "to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, healthcare exclusion and natural or man-made disasters".¹³

Programme approaches: Most INGOs are directly involved in planning, implementing and managing development programmes and humanitarian assistance in developing countries. Their approaches can range from the operational implementation of programmes, to working wholly through partners, where they have no direct role in programme implementation. Most INGOs undertake a mix of approaches, often informed by practice models and theoretical frameworks, and by performance and quality standards. In these respects, INGOs do not necessarily differ from national CSOs: the difference, as stated above, relates to the scale and geographic reach of INGOs' programmatic approaches.

Policy dialogue and campaigning: Some INGOs are also involved in policy dialogue, advocacy, lobbying and campaigning work at the domestic and international level. This work may be undertaken as part of global campaigns or coalitions, and is usually designed to bring about structural or policy change

in relation to development problems. These roles are connected to a view that, in addition to undertaking programmes in developing countries to address the symptoms of poverty, CSOs should also be involved in addressing the underlying causes of poverty — and that this means undertaking policy dialogue and influencing roles.¹⁴ As a result, INGOs such as World Vision and CARE have increased their policy, advocacy and campaigning roles in recent years. For instance, CARE states that:

“Advocacy is a key aspect of CARE’s humanitarian and development efforts, addressing not only the immediate needs of the poor, but also the root causes of poverty and obstacles to its elimination.”¹⁵

Increasing role in research: INGOs draw on the global reach and the cumulative experience of their confederation members for both their programme delivery and for their policy influence work. They undertake research and learning processes to ensure that both their development programmes and their policy influence work are informed by their own programme experience and knowledge, and in particular by their relationships with developing-country partners and communities. Increasingly, some INGOs are commissioning research to establish a stronger evidence base for both programming and policy influence. Many national INGO affiliates now have dedicated research units, along with teams in the international secretariat of INGOs (their consortium’s coordinating body). For instance, in the first half of 2012, the Oxfam International research unit produced reports on climate change, food security, the arms trade and the African Union.¹⁶

Changing roles for a changing world: Similar to official donors and other international development

institutions, INGO roles are not static: they change and respond to the changing global context for development. Some commentators suggest that changing geopolitical dynamics at the global level have particular implications for the roles of INGOs. In this context, INGOs are assuming greater and more important roles at the supranational level, ensuring that global public goods are handled and distributed in ways that benefit rather than disadvantage poor people.¹⁷ INGOs are also increasingly drawing on their capacity to work with States and international organizations to address transnational problems, such as climate change, global poverty, urbanization, complex humanitarian crises and security threats in a globalized world.¹⁸

2.3 WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INGOs IN SIZE, SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES?

The size and scope of INGOs is one of their defining characteristics and a key reason why they occupy an important position within international development cooperation. World Vision International, the world's largest INGO, has an annual budget of US\$2.8 billion (in 2011), which is greater than the budget of all UN agencies combined other than the World Food Programme (WFP), and more than the gross national income (GNI) of smaller African and European countries.¹⁹ World Vision International's global revenue in 2011 was larger than the aid budgets of 12 out of the 23 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors.

INGOs' scale and scope are the result of dramatic increases in their budgets over the last 15 years. They are channelling more aid to developing countries than ever before.²⁰ The eight largest INGOs by revenue in

2005 (World Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International and Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE International, CARITAS International, and ActionAid International) earned a total of US\$11.7 billion in 2011, a 40 percent increase in these years.²¹ The flow of money through INGOs for humanitarian assistance has also grown significantly: in 2007, INGOs supplied US\$4.9 billion of the US\$15 billion in humanitarian assistance provided by all aid actors.²²

The sources of INGO revenue can vary quite significantly. Private donations amounted to 89.5 percent of the revenue of Médecins Sans Frontières in 2012,²³ while CARE International received more than 60 percent of its revenue from official donors.²⁴ Between 2007 and 2011, all NGOs (mainly INGOs) contributed over US\$20 billion to humanitarian assistance from private sources, while also channelling US\$14.4 billion from official donor sources.²⁵

INGO sources of funding also often vary by country. Private voluntary organizations registered with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) received more than six times as much funding from private donors in 2008 than from USAID.²⁶ While the origins of INGO funding vary significantly from organization to organization, INGOs in general are collectively dependent on official donors for approximately half of their budgets.²⁷

Structures of INGOs: The structures of INGOs vary from one to the other but also have a number of common key features. Most of the largest INGOs operate as independent registered organizations within a donor country, with their own governance structures and programme arrangements. Most also have programme management and implementation offices in developing countries. At the same time, as

noted above, INGOs are members of confederations and affiliations, and this affiliation also determines the characteristics of their structures and operations.

Each confederation has its own development objectives, priorities and set of operating standards and principles (and in some cases internal codes of conducts) to which each confederation member must agree and is required to follow. Management arrangements, the way programmes are funded and implemented and, in particular, the way that offices and programmes in developing countries operate can vary widely between (and sometimes within) the different international confederations.

For instance, CARE International is a confederation of 14 member countries. Each member is an autonomous member of the confederation, bound by CARE International norms. CARE programmes in developing countries operate as one programme (rather than as programmes of individual members). Each country programme is implemented and administered by a nominated 'lead member' of the confederation, while other confederation 'member partners' provide financial and other support for particular aspects of the programme. An internal code of conduct specifies roles and responsibilities for all members of CARE International.

Oxfam International has a different structure for operating in developing countries. In the past, its 17 affiliate members have independently undertaken their own development programmes, with the result that there could be numerous Oxfam affiliates working in one country and undertaking their own separate programmes. Oxfam is now undertaking a major transformation of how the confederation operates, moving towards a 'single management structure'. Similar

to CARE, this will result in one Oxfam confederation member operating and running programmes in each developing country as the designated 'managing affiliate', with other Oxfams operating as 'contributing affiliates', undertaking primarily funding roles but also contributing programme advice and dialogue. In some cases, however, contributing affiliates may opt to continue to maintain offices in developing countries, with the result that there could still be several Oxfams with a presence in one developing country.

INGO confederation affiliates or members have traditionally been based in Northern countries where they raise most of their revenue. But due to changing global dynamics, some INGO confederations now have autonomous member organizations in developing countries. This includes Oxfam International, for whom Oxfam India is a confederation member, and CARE International, where CARE Thailand is a confederation member.

It is also useful to note that some INGOs are undertaking changes in governance and management structures to facilitate greater representation and ownership of stakeholders in developing countries. For instance, ActionAid, which works in 45 countries globally, moved its headquarters from London to Johannesburg in 2003, to help "to further strengthen our accountability to the people, communities and countries we work with and make us more effective in fighting and eradicating poverty."²⁸ The Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), originally established as a consortium of INGOs to respond to African emergencies, also moved its headquarters from London to Nairobi around 2005 to transform itself from a Northern consortium into an Africa-led international alliance.²⁹

2.4 NATURE OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH TRADITIONAL AND DEVELOPING DONORS AND HOST-COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS

INGOs have a range of relationships with traditional donors in relation to both funding and non-funding issues.

Funding relationships: Funding is a key part of the relationship between INGOs and donors. Official donor funding is extremely important to INGOs: they depend on donors for about half of their total revenue.³⁰

Before considering the characteristics of this funding relationship, it is important to first recognize that while funding from donor governments is important to INGOs, INGOs are also important to these governments. INGOs represent a key way in which governments engage in developing countries. Governments support INGOs and other donor-country CSOs for a range of reasons, but one of the main ones is that the delivery of aid through INGOs and CSOs allows them to expand their options for operationalizing their own development cooperation priorities. For instance, INGOs are able to undertake fast and efficient responses to humanitarian crises, and their emphasis on supporting civil society is consistent with most donors' own objectives of strengthening the role of civil society in service delivery and reducing poverty in developing countries.

Funding to and through INGOs is usually tied to donor governments' own sector and geographic programmes but often extends their scope and geographic reach. In many cases (such as directly supporting governments in fragile states), INGOs represent a relatively low-risk delivery option, due to their ability to work through global affiliates and members of confederations, their

presence on the ground, their ability to demonstrate results and impact, and their relatively sophisticated systems for ensuring accountability for funds.

Nevertheless, the transfer of funds from official donors to an INGO defines the nature of their relationship to a great extent. Before the donor provides funds, INGOs must usually demonstrate that they are an eligible, trustworthy recipient; that they can efficiently manage the funds once transferred; that they can implement programmes, monitor their progress and demonstrate results; and that they can demonstrate accountability for the use of the funds. In Australia, for instance, INGOs are required to fulfil a rigorous accreditation process, with requirements in each of the above areas, to be considered eligible for core funding from the government.³¹

The fulfilment of donor accountability requirements represents a key part of INGOs' relationship with official donor funders. INGOs are required to demonstrate fiscal accountability: to show that the funds have been used for the purpose they were provided for, and that they can be accounted for. INGOs are also required to demonstrate accountability in terms of agreed outputs and outcomes. This is often a more complex and time-consuming process; in some cases, demonstrating a causal relationship between the provision of funds for development activities and specific outcomes is difficult (for instance, in programmes to strengthen women's rights, or that build capacity of CSOs). Many INGOs have established dedicated staff teams to meet programme accountability requirements.

Accountability is one of the evolving areas in the INGO–donor relationship. This is the result of the changing global environment for aid and development, and affects both donors and INGOs. Many donor

governments, especially those undertaking budgetary constraint, are under strong political and economic pressure to justify budgetary expenditure on aid and development, to demonstrate value for money and results for the money provided through the aid programme, and to be accountable to citizens and taxpayers for the use of the funds. When donors provide aid funds to INGOs, they also pass on the requirements to demonstrate results, value for money and accountability. When INGOs in turn draw on donor funds to work with partners, they often also pass on donor accountability requirements to their partner organizations, which they require to report against donor standards and requirements. This has resulted in debate about ownership in CSO programmes: whether INGOs should be primarily accountable to donors for the funds they have received, or to the communities and partners they work with.³² Many INGOs struggle to fulfil accountability requirements towards donors, while also ensuring they are maintaining their commitments to partners.

Non-funding relationships: Relationships between donors and INGOs are often dominated by the funding aspect. In any relationship, the provision of funds from one entity to another establishes a power imbalance that favours the donor, with the donor able to set the terms of the relationship, and the recipient ultimately forced to accept these terms. At worst, donor–INGO relationships follow this prescription and are based on a principal–agent arrangement, where the government provides the funds, and the INGO accepts them and implements programmes according to the donor’s requirements. In these cases, donor roles in the government–CSO relationship have tended to focus on contract and risk management, and INGOs’ roles have been limited to implementation and meeting reporting and accountability requirements.³³

Both INGOs and donor governments have recognized that relationships that are defined by principal-agent and strict contract management arrangements are not suitable for addressing complex development problems. They limit opportunities to respond to unforeseen circumstances and frequently changing development contexts, to learn from experience and improve practice and outcomes based on this learning.

As a result, donors and INGOs are increasingly working to develop the non-funding dimensions of their relationships, most commonly by exploring a greater emphasis on partnerships. These may exist alongside funding arrangements, but their general aim is to increase the scope and quality of the relationships. Key features of partnership arrangements between donors and INGOs are based on principles such as collaboration, trust, open dialogue, mutual respect and sharing, a long-term view of results and outcomes, and flexibility and willingness to adapt to changed circumstances.³⁴

In some cases these partnerships are built into core or framework funding arrangements, where there is a recognition that INGOs have a certain level of expertise and capacity to undertake their own development programmes within broadly agreed parameters, but where there is also an expectation of frequent exchange, learning and policy dialogue between the donor and INGO. For instance, World Vision Australia is very active in ongoing dialogue in relation to its core funding partnership agreement with the Australian government. AusAID now views World Vision as “partners rather than tenderers”. Where World Vision and AusAID priorities coincide, AusAID sees that World Vision can be trusted to undertake activities with minimal direction from AusAID.³⁵

In other cases INGOs provide direct advice to donor governments as part of partnership and policy dialogue, including on donors' programming, and sometimes on their funding models. Thus there are both advocacy and collaborative aspects of CSO–donor relationships. For instance, Oxfam Australia directly contributed to the design of one of AusAID's geographic funding programmes, in the context of its funding and partnership arrangement. AusAID sees that CSOs have expertise in areas that it does not, in particular at the country level.³⁶

2.5 IMPLICATIONS OF INGO OPERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING-COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL (LOCAL) CSOs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

INGOs' geographic reach, staff numbers, global presence and substantial budgets mean that they are major players within the international aid system. This has particular implications in developing countries. Along with bilateral and multilateral organizations, INGOs constitute a significant component of external engagement in domestic development processes for both governments and domestic civil society.³⁷

Implications for communities in developing countries: INGOs have a major role in developing countries, and can sometimes constitute the main international presence in some regions or locations, in particular those that are more remote, affected by conflict or less important economically or politically. This means that some communities experience the aid system — including its programmes and institutions — primarily through INGOs.³⁸ In these cases, there is a heavy onus of responsibility on INGOs: to operate ethically, to work collaboratively and productively with

communities, to ensure positive outcomes of their interventions, and to be accountable for their actions. INGO presence in communities can be highly visible, and long-term: World Vision, for instance, establishes a 15-year presence in communities through its Area Development Plans and offices and its teams that support these plans.

Implications for national (local) CSOs in developing countries: The size, scope and extensive presence of INGOs in developing countries can have important implications for national (local) CSOs. These can be both positive and negative.

INGOs provide a range of opportunities and relationships for local CSOs, through both their funding and non-funding roles. Many local CSOs depend on INGOs to support their own development activities (through core, programme or project funding), and many also undertake work on behalf of INGOs (through project subcontracting work). INGOs provide important capacity development opportunities for local CSOs, as well as exposure to an increased range of expertise and development approaches. Many local CSOs view INGOs as an established and important component of the development environment, and work alongside them in funding or partnership arrangements, or in non-funding collaborative approaches, such as knowledge and practice networks, or through collaboration in policy dialogue with governments, donors or the private sector.

At the same time, however, the major physical and sustained presence of INGOs in developing countries can have negative implications for local CSOs. INGOs' larger programmes, budgets and staffing contingents, as well as their use of foreign consultants, can cause them to 'crowd out' local development organizations,

which may have knowledge, skills and capacities that are more closely linked to, and better informed by, 'on-the-ground' realities. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka, for example, "local experts were often reduced to the level of research assistants and left to carry out mundane administrative tasks instead of contributing to the leadership."³⁹

Large INGOs with high visibility in developing countries are also sometimes more likely to gain access to local government officials, and can have more opportunities to influence decision-making.⁴⁰ They may also be more likely than local CSOs to win grants and contracts that are available at the developing-country level. In some cases, INGOs are seen as a source of 'brain drain' from local CSOs and governments, because they offer higher salaries and better terms and conditions. These differences between INGOs and local CSOs set up an unfortunate dynamic that may lead to resentment and difficult working relationships.

Implications for developing-country governments:

The significant on-the-ground presence of INGOs has a number of implications for developing-country governments. Governments can have a variety of relationships with INGOs. At the simplest level, this may occur through INGOs legally registering their presence with the government. The relationship in many cases, however, extends beyond this to both informal and formal engagements on the programmatic work of INGOs. In some cases, in particular where the government has a policy on the role of CSOs, INGOs may be required to enter into Memoranda of Understanding with the government. These may include mechanisms for the government to ensure INGOs are working within the general parameters of its overall development effort. In rare cases, a government may require INGOs to align with its major strategies or

priority sectors.⁴¹ In many other cases, however, other than registration, relationships between host-country governments and INGOs may be minimal.

Whatever the nature of the relationship, the major presence of INGOs means that they are undertaking significant development programmes, nearly always in a context where the government is also undertaking (or attempting to undertake) its own development programmes. As a result, governments are at the very least interested in information about what INGOs are doing. In some cases, INGOs will consciously fill gaps in government development programmes, either in terms of the range of services provided or of their geographic reach. In some cases, governments and INGOs can address issues and collaborate on programmes. In these cases, governments can see INGOs as important actors in the development arena, as sources of collaboration, and of increasing and improving the scope of development programming.

This, however, is not always the case. INGOs by nature are independent organizations. They, therefore, will want to maintain a certain distance from government, with the ability to operate as development actors in their own right. In this way they continue to demonstrate their unique or niche approaches and pursue their own particular development programmes, responding to the needs and interests in communities and in locations of their own choice.

Many governments in developing countries recognize INGOs' need to maintain independence, whereby INGOs increase the range of development actors, services and opportunities for communities (and for local CSOs). Nevertheless, the particular roles and approaches of INGOs can represent a challenge to some governments. Governments may be concerned that

INGOs undertake major development programmes, with significant geographic reach and with major presence, but that these are not coordinated with existing government programmes. In some cases, governments may feel that INGOs' particular approaches undermine their own programmes, or that their approaches are inconsistent with government priorities. This is often the case at the level of regional or local governments, which are closer to the actual operations of INGOs. As such, the presence of INGOs in developing countries often means an ongoing negotiation with different levels of government, in terms of respective roles, development contributions and terms of engagement.

ANNEX

SAMPLE OF SOME OF THE LARGEST INGOsⁱ

(US Dollars; in alphabetical orderⁱⁱ)

TABLE 1

ORGANIZATION	INCOME 2011	STAFF NUMBERS	GEOGRAPHIC REACH
ActionAid (Johannesburg, South Africa) ⁱⁱⁱ	\$314 million	2,328	- 45 countries - 25 million people
Aga Khan Development Network (Geneva, Switzerland)	Development activities budget \$450 million (2008) ⁴²	60,000	- 25 countries
CARE International (Chatelaine, Switzerland)	\$780 million	12,000	- 87 countries - 60 million people - 12 national members
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (Baltimore, USA)	\$823 million	5,211	- 100 countries - 130 million people
Christian Aid (London, UK)	\$148 million	758	- 45 countries
Médecins Sans Frontières (Geneva, Switzerland)	\$1.24 billion	22,000	- 60 countries
Mercy Corps (Portland, USA)	\$301 million	3,700	- 40 countries
Oxfam International (Oxford, UK)	\$1.25 billion	6,000	- 98 countries - 14 member organizations
Plan International (Woking, UK)	\$827 million	8,131	- 48 countries
Save the Children (London, UK)	\$1.4 billion	14,000	- 120 countries - 29 national organizations - 80 million children
World Vision International (Monrovia, California, USA)	\$2.79 billion	40,000	- 120 countries - 100 million people

Notes Table 1

- i Information is derived from INGO official annual reports and websites. While annual reports generally cover the fiscal period from January to 31 December 2011, some organizations report figures based on different fiscal periods within the nominated year. Staffing and geographic reach are 2008 data.*
- ii All figures were converted to US\$ using average midpoint currency exchange rates retrieved from <http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates> for the fiscal periods indicated.*
- iii The headquarters of each INGO is listed below its name. However, the term is used loosely here. Some INGOs are structured hierarchically, while others have international offices that operate more or less independently from each other and are simply coordinated by a single office.*

TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF OECD DONORS AND PROMINENT INGOsⁱ

DAC Donor/INGO	ODA/INGO revenue (US\$ 2010 millions) ⁱⁱ
United States of America	29,431
United Kingdom	12,871
Germany	11,884
Japan	10,842
France	10,073
Spain	5532
Netherlands	5518
Canada	4703
Norway	4228
Sweden	4137
Australia	3813
World Vision (2011)	2790
Italy	2763
Denmark	2675
Belgium	2311
Switzerland	1904
Save the Children (2011)	1400
Finland	1287
Oxfam International (2011)	1250
Médecins Sans Frontières (2011)	1240
Republic of Korea	1171
Austria	929
Ireland	895
Plan International (2011)	827
Catholic Relief Services (2011)	823
CARE USA/International (2011)	780
Portugal	622
Aga Khan Development Network (2008)	450
Greece	405
New Zealand	330
ActionAid (2011)	314
Mercy Corps (2011)	301

Notes Table 2

- i* Figures for OECD donors are derived from the OECD's International Development Statistics, (<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE1>) for 2010 and represent total ODA, net of imputed student costs, debt relief, and refugee in donor country allocations. Figures for INGOs derived from their official annual reports and websites. Annual reports generally cover the fiscal period 1 January to 31 December. Some organizations report figures based on different fiscal periods within the nominated year.
- ii* Annual figures converted to US\$ using average midpoint currency exchange rates retrieved from <http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates> for the fiscal periods indicated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACORD, 'About Us – Governance – ACORD', Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, Nairobi, 2013.

<http://www.acordinternational.org/acord/en/about-us/about-us/governance/>

ActionAid, 'About Us – History – ActionAid', ActionAid, Johannesburg, 2013.

<http://www.actionaid.org/main.aspx?PageID=7>

AusAID, 'Accreditation for non-government organisations', AusAID, Canberra, 2013.

<http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/pages/accreditation.aspx>

Bieckmann, F., 'Rooting INGOs in their home soil', *The Broker, Special Edition – The Future Calling: A Second Life for INGOs*, 2012, Issue 28, March 2012.

Brown, L.D., 'Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability: Issues and Challenges', *Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and CIVICUS Working Paper*, No. 32, Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Cambridge, MA, 2007.

CARE International, 'About Us', CARE International, Chatelaine, 2013a.

<http://www.care-international.org/about-us.aspx>

CARE International, 'Advocacy', CARE International, Chatelaine, 2013b.

<http://www.care-international.org/what-we-do/advocacy.aspx>

CARE International, 'Annual Report', CARE International, Chatelaine, 2013c.

<http://www.care-international.org/Annual-Report.aspx>

Ebrahim, A., 'Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs', *World Development*, 2003, 31(5): 813–829.

Edwards, M. and Hulme, D., 'NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World', *Journal of International Development*, 1995, 7(6): 849–856.

Global Humanitarian Assistance, 'Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2009', Global Humanitarian Assistance, Bristol, 2009.

<http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/GHA-Report-2009.pdf>

- Global Humanitarian Assistance**, 'Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013', Global Humanitarian Assistance, Bristol, 2013.
<http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/4216>
- Hammad, L. and Morton, W.**, 'Greater Influence, Greater Responsibility: are INGOs' Self-Regulatory Accountability Standards Effective?', *Working Paper*, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, 2011.
<http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2011-Greater-Influence-Greater-Responsibility-are-INGOs-Self-Regulatory-Accountability-Standards-Effective.pdf>
- Kelegama, S. and de Mel, D.**, 'Sri Lanka: Country Study', prepared for the project 'Southern Perspectives on Reform of the International Development Architecture', North-South Institute, Ottawa, 2007.
- Médecins Sans Frontières**, 'MSF Financial Report 2008', Médecins Sans Frontières, Geneva, 2009.
http://www.msf.org/source/financial/2008/MSF_Financial_Report_2008.pdf
- Médecins Sans Frontières**, 'Médecins Sans Frontières', Médecins Sans Frontières, Geneva, 2013.
<http://www.msf.org/>
- Najam, A.**, 'NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', *Development Policy Review*, 1996, 14: 339–353.
- O'Dwyer, B., and Unerman, J.**, 'The Paradox of Greater NGO Accountability: A Case Study of Amnesty Ireland', *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 2008, 33: 801–824.
- Oxfam**, 'About us', Oxfam, Oxford, 2013a.
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/about>
- Oxfam**, 'African Union Compendium', Oxfam, Oxford, 2013b.
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/african-union-compendium>
- Plan International**, 'What we do', Plan International, Woking, 2013.
<http://plan-international.org/what-we-do>

Ronalds, P., *The Change Imperative: Creating the Next Generation NGO*, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, CT, 2010.

Save the Children, 'Save the Children', Save the Children, London, 2013.

<http://www.savethechildren.net/>

Szporluk, M., 'A Framework for Understanding Accountability of International NGOs and Global Good Governance', *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 2009, 16(1): 339–361.

USAID, '2010 Volag: Report of Voluntary Agencies', United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, 2010.

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT627.pdf

World Vision International, 'Where we work', World Vision International, Monrovia, CA, 2013a.

<http://www.wvi.org>

World Vision International, 'Annual Reports & Reviews', World Vision International, Monrovia, CA, 2013b.

<http://www.worldvision.com.au/aboutus/AnnualReportsAndReviews.aspx>

ENDNOTES

- 1 See Annex A for a discussion of terminology. NGOs and INGOs are considered a subset of CSOs for the purposes of this study.
- 2 Hammad and Morton, 2011.
- 3 Save The Children, 2013.
- 4 World Vision International, 2013a.
- 5 Oxfam, 2013a.
- 6 World Vision International, 2013b.
- 7 Ronalds, 2010: 8.
- 8 CARE International, 2013a.
- 9 Oxfam, 2013a.
- 10 World Vision International, 2013a.
- 11 Save The Children, 2013; and Plan International, 2013.
- 12 ActionAid, 2013.
- 13 Médecins Sans Frontières, 2013.
- 14 Ronalds, 2010: 9.
- 15 CARE International, 2013b.
- 16 Oxfam, 2013b.
- 17 Bieckmann, 2012: 4.
- 18 Ronalds, 2010: 7.
- 19 Ronalds, 2010: 7.
- 20 Hammad and Morton, 2011.
- 21 Ronalds, 2010: 6.
- 22 Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2009.
- 23 Médecins Sans Frontières, 2009.
- 24 CARE International, 2013c.
- 25 See Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013.
- 26 USAID, 2010.
- 27 Szporluk, 2009: 339–361.
- 28 ActionAid, 2013.
- 29 ACORD, 2013.
- 30 Szporluk, 2009: 339–361.

- 31 AusAID, 2013.
- 32 See Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 849–856; Najam, 1996: 339–353; Brown, 2007; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008: 801–824; and Ebrahim, 2003: 813–829.
- 33 Informant interviews, 2012.
- 34 Oxfam Australia submission to Independent Review of Aid: follow-up paper (available on request).
- 35 Informant interview.
- 36 Informant interview.
- 37 Hammad and Morton, 2011.
- 38 Hammad and Morton, 2011.
- 39 Kelegama and de Mel, 2007: 24.
- 40 Hammad and Morton, 2011.
- 41 Informant interview. For instance, a few years after independence, the Government of Eritrea required all INGOs to work only in the health and education sector.
- 42 The project companies of the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development generate annual revenues of \$1.5 billion.